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Abstract—In this paper, we consider revenue maximization
problem for a two server system in the presence of heterogeneous
customers. We assume that the customers differ in their cost
for unit delay and this is modeled as a continuous random
variable with a distribution F. We also assume that each server
charges an admission price to each customer that decide to join
its queue. We first consider the monopoly problem where both
the servers belong to a single operator. The heterogeneity of
the customer makes the analysis of the problem difficult. The
difficulty lies in the inability to characterize the equilibrium
queue arrival rates as a function of the admission prices. We
provide an equivalent formulation with the queue arrival rates as
the optimization variable simplifying the analysis for revenue rate
maximization for the monopoly. We then consider the duopoly
problem where each server competes with the other server
to maximize its revenue rate. For the duopoly problem, the
interest is to obtain the set of admission prices satisfying the
Nash equilibrium conditions. While the problem is in general
difficult to analyze, we consider the special case when the two
servers are identical. For such a duopoly system, we obtain the
necessary condition for existence of symmetric Nash equilibrium
of the admission prices. The knowledge of the distribution F
characterizing the heterogeneity of the customers is necessary
to solve the monopoly and the duopoly problem. However, for
most practical scenarios, the functional form of F may not be
known to the system operator and in such cases, the revenue
maximizing prices cannot be determined. In the last part of the
paper, we provide a simple method to estimate the distribution
F by suitably varying the admission prices. We illustrate the
method with some numerical examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many service systems, the quality of service received
is characterized by the queueing delay that is experienced
by the customers in the system. Examples of such service
systems that can be modeled as queueing systems include road
and transport systems, health-care systems, computer systems,
call centers and communications systems. The customers that
receive service in such systems are usually sensitive to the
delay experienced in these system. Further, such customers
have non-identical preferences to the delay experienced. It is
often beneficial for the service system to account for these
heterogeneous preferences in any optimization concerning the
use of system resources. Many service systems have emerged
that exploit the heterogeneous nature of customers and use it to
their advantage. For example, airlines offer priority boarding
queues for payment of an additional fee. In this paper, we
consider the problem of exploiting the heterogeneous nature
of customers for revenue maximization in parallel server
systems. We model heterogeneity of customers by assuming
that different customers have different cost for a unit delay.
We consider service systems that consist of two parallel,
possibly heterogeneous servers where each server has an
associated queue for the customers to wait. The scheduling
discipline at each server is work conserving and does not dis-
criminate between customers on the basis of their preference
for delay. The servers charge an admission price to every
customer joining its queue. We assume that the queues are
not observable and only the expected delay as a function of
the arrival rate is available. We also assume that the expected
delay at any server is monotone increasing in the arrival rate
of customers to that server. The customers that use the system
are strategic and make an individually optimal queue-join
decision. We assume that customers differ in their cost for
unit delay which is characterized by a random variable with a
continuous distribution denoted by F. For a customer, the cost
at a server is the sum of the admission price and the delay cost
at the server. We assume that customers cannot balk from the
system without obtaining service and such traffic is commonly
seen in cloud-computing, purchase of essential services etc.
In this paper, we consider the problem of revenue maxi-
mization in such a service system by suitably choosing the
admission prices at two parallel servers. Depending on the
objective of each of these servers, we consider two natural
scenarios. In a monopoly, we assume that the two servers
belong to the same operator. The objective here is to maximize
the total revenue rate, i.e., the sum of the revenue rate from
the two servers. In the second scenario, we assume that each
server belongs to separate operators and each server has the
objective of maximizing its individual revenue rate. This is an
example of a duopoly where the service systems compete with
one another to maximize their individual revenue rate.
Now consider the scenario of a monopoly market discussed
above where the service system has two parallel servers. In
the absence of balking, it is not difficult to see that a revenue
maximizing strategy for the monopoly is to keep both the
admission prices at infinity. This is because as customers
cannot balk, they are required to choose one of the server
for service. Therefore one has to consider a more meaningful
model for the monopoly market. Towards this, we assume
that the admission price at one of the server, say Server 2 is
fixed a-priori. This dissuades the service provider from fixing
the admission price at Server 1 to unreasonably high values.
Our interest for this model is to characterize the revenue
maximizing admission price at Server 1 for different examples
of the delay functions at the queue and when customers differ
in their delay cost.
Classical monopoly models have been well studied for the
2case of single server queues. One of the first work to analyze
such a model is Naor [1]. This model considers a single
server queueing system where homogeneous customers obtain
a reward after service completion. The queue is observable
to arriving customers who choose to either join the queue or
balk. For such a system, the revenue maximizing admission
price was first obtained in [1]. Subsequently, there have been
several works analyzing the revenue maximization problem
for various models such as a multiserver queue [2], GI/M/1
queue [3], customers with heterogeneous service valuations
[4] and queue length dependent prices [5]. While the above
models assume that the queue lengths are observable, Edelson
and Hilderbrand [6] were the first to consider the revenue
maximization problem for the case when queues are not
observable. See [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] for some other single
server revenue maximization models.
The key difference of our model with that of the literature
discussed above is as follows. Firstly, in our model, customers
are inelastic in their demand and hence balking is not allowed.
Secondly, the customers have to obtain service at either of the
two servers and the admission price at one of the server is
fixed. Finally, the customers have heterogeneous preference
for the delay experienced in the queue. This feature makes
our model meaningful but also difficult to analyze. For such
parallel server models, the structural properties for the equi-
librium routing have been obtained recently [12], [13]. We use
the structural property of the equilibrium routing to solve the
the revenue maximization problem for the monopoly.
For the duopoly problem with two competing and identical
servers, we assume that the objective for each server is to
set an admission price that maximizes its revenue rate. We
are interested in studying the existence of Nash Equilibrium
prices that would be set by the two servers. The earliest work
analyzing the duopoly model with heterogeneous customers
was by Luski [14] and Levhari and Luski [15]. Both the
models assume that the customers are allowed to balk. Luski
[14] is interested in knowing whether the revenue maximizing
prices set by the two service systems can be equal. It is
observed that when the parameters of the model are such
that the customers have no incentive to balk, the revenue
maximizing prices set by two identical servers is equal. This
is however not the case when some of the customers prefer to
balk. In this case, the equilibrium revenue maximizing prices
are not equal. Levhari and Luski [15] provide a numerical
analysis for the problem introduced in Luski [14]. Armony
and Haviv [16] analyze this problem for the case when the
customers are from a finite number of classes and each
class has a distinct cost for unit delay. A numerical analysis
of the Nash equilibrium admission prices between the two
competing servers is provided. Chen and Wan [17] consider
the revenue maximization in a duopoly with a single customer
class. The service system is modeled by M/M/1 queues and
the customers are allowed to balk from the system. These
assumptions on the system model allows them to obtain the
sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium.
Similar conditions were found in Dube and Jain [18] who
consider an N -player oligopoly with multiclass customers.
The customer classes differ only in their arrival rates and
have the same delay cost per unit time. A differentiated
service model is considered by Dube and Jain [19] where
each player now operates two types of services and each
service is used by a dedicated class of customers. Again,
the key result in [19] is to obtain the sufficient condition
for the Nash equilibrium prices. Mandjes and Timmers [20]
consider a duopoly model with two customer classes differing
in their delay cost. The model assumes a finite number of
customers and the utility of a queue is a decreasing function
of the number of customers using this server. Given the prices
at the servers, they provide an algorithm that determines
the equilibrium number of customers of each class that is
to be allocated to the two servers. While the existence and
uniqueness of such a customer equilibrium is provided, the
existence of Nash equilibrium prices is only conjectured. In
[21], [22] the demand rate at different servers is modeled using
specific functions (known as demand models in such literature)
instead of being calculated from the (Wardrop) equilibrium
conditions [23]. This assumptions make the analysis relatively
simpler. Ayesta et. al. [24] consider the oligopoly pricing
game for a single customer class and obtain the necessary
and sufficient conditions on the Nash equilibrium prices when
the queues have identical delay functions. A best-response
algorithm is then provided to numerically obtain these Nash
equilibrium prices.
Most of the monopoly and duopoly models described above,
make simplifying assumptions on the customer classes to
characterize the underlying Wardrop equilibrium [23]. Addi-
tional simplification of the analysis is obtained by considering
convex and increasing delay functions at the queues. We do
not make any of these assumptions in this paper. We utilize the
structure of the Wardrop equilibrium that was characterized in
[12], [13] to analyze the two problems. This structure on the
equilibrium allows us to provide an equivalent revenue maxi-
mization formulation for both the monopoly and the duopoly
that is simpler to analyze. For the duopoly problem we provide
sufficient conditions on the symmetric Nash equilibrium prices
when the competing servers are identical.
For most practical scenarios, the distribution function F (·)
characterizing the delay cost for a customer may not be
known to the service system. The revenue maximizing strategy
on the other hand depend on the distribution F (·). Without
any knowledge of F (·), it is not be possible to ascertain a
revenue optimal admission price at the servers and in such
cases, the service system is required estimate this distribution
function. Towards the end of this paper, we shall provide a
simple method to estimate this distribution F (·) by varying the
admission prices and observing the change in the equilibrium
traffic routing. The service system can then use this estimate
to perform the necessary revenue maximization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we shall formalize the notations and provide some
preliminaries. We then formulate the revenue maximization
problems in Section III. In Section IV, we consider the
monopoly problem for revenue optimization followed by the
duopoly problem in Section V. Finally in Section VI, we
illustrate a mechanism based on admission pricing to estimate
the distribution function F.
3II. PRELIMINARIES
We will first introduce the notations that will be used
throughout this paper. In both the monopoly and the duopoly
model, we assume that the system has two servers. Let cj
denote the admission price at Server j where j = 1, 2. The
customers arrive according to a homogeneous Poisson process
with rate λ and have a service requirement that is i.i.d with
exponential distribution and unit mean. Let Dj(γj) denote
the delay function associated with queue j when the queue
arrival rate is γj , where j = 1, 2. Note that γ1 + γ2 = λ.
We assume that Dj is monotone increasing and continuously
differentiable in the interior of its domain with a strictly posi-
tive derivative. Additionally we assume that the cost function
at the two server satisfies the following two conditions (1)
D1(0) < D2(λ) <∞ and (2) D2(0) < D1(λ) <∞.
We associate with each arriving customer a continuous
random variable β that quantifies a customer’s sensitivity to
delay or congestion. We shall assume that the delay sensitivity
β for a customer is a realization of the random variable β.
The customer arrivals constitute a marked Poisson process of
intensity λ×F on R×R+. Here F is an absolutely continuous
cumulative distribution function supported on the interval [a, b]
of positive reals. We additionally assume that F (·) is strictly
increasing and hence f(x) 6= 0 for any x ∈ [a, b] where f(·)
is the corresponding density function.
We now recall the Wardrop equilibrium conditions [23],
[13] that characterize the individually optimal choice of server
made by the arriving customers. A customer with delay cost
β entering the system must choose a queue j so as to
minimize cj + βDj(γj). Here γj is determined through the
strategies of all customers. We assume that the quantities
λ1, λ2, Dj(·), F (·) and cj , for j = 1, 2 is part of common
knowledge. We also assume that the customers do not have
access to current or past queue occupancies, or the history
of arrival times. The strategy of a customer is restricted to
choosing a server according to a fixed probability distribution
and such joint strategies are represented by a stochastic kernel,
denoted by KW . We interpret KW (β, i) as the probability
that a customer with delay sensitivity β chooses queue i
at equilibrium. For the two server system, the equilibrium
kernel KW must satisfy the following Wardrop equilibrium
conditions.
KW (β, i) ≥ 0 implies ci + βDi(γi) ≤ c3−i + βD3−i(γ3−i).
(1)
In words, this means that if customers with delay cost β
choose Server i at equilibrium, then the expected cost for this
customer at Server i must be at most the expected cost at
Server 3 − i for i = 1, 2. For a kernel KW , note that the
arrival rate of customers to Server j is given by
γj = λ
∫ b
β=a
KW (β, j)dF (β).
We now provide the following theorem that is a restatement
of Corollary 4 in [13]. This theorem characterizes the Wardrop
equilibrium kernel for a system with two parallel servers.
Theorem 1: Define δi as the probability distribution that
puts unit mass on i and suppose that the kernel KW satis-
fies the Wardrop equilibrium condition. Then there exists a
threshold β1 with β1 ∈ [a, b] such that
• when c1 > c2 (resp. c1 < c2),
KW (β, ·) =
{
δ1 (resp. δ2) for β ∈ (β1, b],
δ2 (resp. δ1) for β ∈ [a, β1].
(2)
Further if β1 ∈ (a, b) then,
c1 + β1D1(γ1) = c2 + β1D2(γ2). (3)
• When c1 = c2, KW is not unique and any kernel K
with γ1 = γ+ is a valid Wardrop equilibrium kernel KW
where γ+ := {γ1 : D1(γ1) = D2(γ2)} .
Refer Figures 1 and 2 for a representation of the Wardrop
equilibrium kernel for the case when c1 > c2 and c1 < c2
respectively. Here f(·) denotes the underlying density function
of the random variable β while the shaded region identifies the
delay cost parameter of those customers that choose Server 1.
Proof: The first part is simply a restatement of Corollary
4 in [13] for the case c1 > c2 and the proof for c1 < c2 is
along similar lines. We now prove the second part. Consider
the case when c1 = c2 and recall the assumption that
D1(0) < D2(λ) and D2(0) < D1(λ). KW must be such
that D1(γ1) = D2(γ2). To see why this must be true, suppose
that this is not true and let D1(γ1) 6= D2(γ2). Customers
from the queue with a higher delay cost will have an incentive
to move to the queue with a lower delay cost. This implies
that a KW with D1(γ1) 6= D2(γ2) is not at equilibrium.
Recall the definition γ+ := {γ1 : D1(γ1) = D2(γ2)} . Since,
D1(0) < D2(λ) and D2(0) < D1(λ), we have 0 < γ+ < λ.
Now for any kernel K satisfying γ1 = γ+, since c1 = c2, the
cost for any customer at the two servers is equal. Hence there
is no incentive for any customer to deviate from its choice of
the server. The Wardrop equilibrium kernel KW though not
unique must however satisfy λ
∫ b
β=aK
W (β, j)dF (β) = γ+.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATIONS
Having characterized the Wardrop equilibrium kernel KW
for a two server system, we will now formulate the rev-
enue maximization problems for both the monopoly and the
duopoly model. Let Rj(cj , γj) := cjγj denote the revenue
rate at server j when the arrival rate of customers due to
the corresponding kernel KW is γj for j = 1, 2. For the
monopoly model, let RT (c1, γ1) denote the revenue rate for
the monopoly service system. Since γ2 = λ − γ1, it suffices
to express the revenue rate as a function of only γ1. We have
RT (c1, γ1) := c1γ1 + c2γ2 = c2λ+ (c1 − c2)γ1.
Note from Theorem 1, that the argument γ1 is determined by
the kernel KW which in turn depends on the admission prices
c1 and c2. This dependence will be made explicit by writing
γ1 as γ1(c1, c2) and the revenue optimization problem for the
monopoly can now be stated as follows.
max
c1
RT (c1, γ1(c1, c2)) = c2λ+ (c1 − c2)γ1(c1, c2)
subject to 0 ≤ c1 ≤ c1
(P1)
41c c2
γ2γ1
β1
f
β
λ
Fig. 1. Representation of KW when c1 > c2.
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Fig. 2. Representation of KW when c1 < c2.
where c1 is an arbitrarily large value such that γ1(c1, c2) = 0.
c1 is a technical requirement to ensure a compact domain and
one could also define c1 := inf {c : γ1(c, c2) = 0} in which
case we have γ1(c1, c2) = 0 for any c1 > c1. To be able
to solve program P1 using standard optimization techniques,
a closed form expression for γ1(c1, c2) would be convenient.
When c1 > c2, and β1 ∈ (a, b), from Theorem 1 and the
definition of γ1, it can be seen that
γ1(c1, c2) = λ(1− F (β1)) (4)
where
β1 = {β : c1 + βD1(λ(1 − F (β))) = c2 + βD2(λF (β))} .
A similar condition follows when c1 < c2 and it can be
seen that obtaining an explicit expression for γ1(c1, c2) is
difficult. Note that we have not assumed any functional form
for Dj and F (·) and for certain choice of these functions,
a closed form expression for γ1(c1, c2) may not be possible.
Without an analytic expression for γ1(c1, c2), it is difficult
to solve the revenue maximization problem. Therefore we
require an alternative approach to solve program P1. One
possible alternative is to let the equilibrium γ1 (the value of
γ1 at equilibrium) be the optimization variable and represent
other variables of the system such as c1, c2, β1 as a function
of γ1. With slight abuse of notation, we will use cj(γj) to
denote the admission price at Server j when the arrival rate
to Server j at equilibrium is γj where j = 1, 2. Similarly, we
shall use β1(γ1) to represent the threshold β1 corresponding
to an equilibrium arrival rate of γ1 to Server 1. Note that
c1(γ1) is also a function of c2. This is because the equilibrium
γ1 depends on the difference (c1 − c2) and not on their
individual values. This is clear from Theorem 1 (Eq. (3)).
Therefore for a given c2 and γ1 ∈ (0, λ) one can determine
c1 using Eq. (3). We have suppressed this dependence on c2
to simplify notation. For the monopoly model c2(γ2) = c2 as
c2 is assumed fixed. Thus the equivalent revenue optimization
problem for the monopoly is as follows.
max
γ1
RT (c1(γ1), γ1) = c2λ+ (c1(γ1)− c2)γ1
subject to 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ1(c2) ≤ λ
(P2)
where γ1(c2) determines the domain for the feasible values of
γ1 as a function of c2. An intuitive explanation for the quantity
γ1(c2) is as follows. Consider the case c1 = c2 = 0. From
Theorem 1, we have γ1 = γ+ where 0 < γ+ < λ. Using the
notation γ1(c1, c2), we have γ1(0, 0) = γ+. For any c1 > 0,
γ1(c1, 0) < γ
+ since the increase in the admission price
at Server 1 makes the server more costly and decreases the
resulting γ1. Clearly, for any c1 ≥ 0 and c2 = 0, γ1 /∈ (γ+, λ]
and c1(γ1) in program P2 cannot be defined for γ1 ∈ (γ+, λ].
Therefore when c2 = 0, the domain for the optimization
variable γ1 should be restricted to [0, γ+]. In general, for an
arbitrary c2, the domain for γ1 in program P2 is defined using
γ1(c2) and this will be characterized formally in Section IV.
Now consider the duopoly market with two competing
servers charging admission prices c1 and c2 to their arriving
customers. The objective of Server j is to choose an admission
price cj that maximizes its revenue rate Rj . For this duopoly,
the revenue optimization problem for Server j is as follows.
max
cj
Rj(cj , γj) = cjγj(cj , cj−)
subject to 0 ≤ cj ≤ cj
given cj−
(P3)
where cj− represents the admission price at the server other
than j, i.e., c1− = c2 and c2− = c1.
For the duopoly market, the aim is to obtain the Nash
equilibrium set of admission prices to be charged at the two
servers. We shall denote the Nash equilibrium prices by the
tuple (c∗1, c∗2). Using the notion of the best response function
[25], (c∗1, c∗2) can be characterized as follows. Let Bi(ci−)
denote the admission price at Server i that maximizes the
server revenue Ri for a given value of ci− for i = 1, 2. Clearly,
Bi(ci−) is the maximizer in program P3 and it is easy to see
that
B1(c2) := {c1 ≥ 0 : c1γ1(c1, c2) ≥ c
′
1γ1(c
′
1, c2)∀c
′
1 ≥ 0}
B2(c1) := {c2 ≥ 0 : c2γ2(c1, c2) ≥ c
′
2γ2(c1, c
′
2)∀c
′
2 ≥ 0} .
5and
(c∗1, c
∗
2) = {(c1, c2) : B1(c2) = c1, B2(c1) = c2} .
However as argued earlier, the closed form expression for
γj(cj , cj−) is not easy to obtain. This makes it difficult to
solve program P3 and obtain the best responses Bi(ci−) for
i = 1, 2. As a result, obtaining (c∗1, c∗2) is in general not easy.
As in the case of the monopoly program, to obtain (c∗1, c∗2), we
need to first reformulate program P3 by letting γj denote the
optimizing variable. The corresponding optimization problem
is as follows.
max
γj
Rj(cj(γj), γj) := cj(γj)γj
subject to 0 ≤ γj ≤ γj(cj− ) ≤ λ
given cj− .
(P4)
cj(γj) can be interpreted as the admission price at Server j
that leads to the equilibrium arrival rate of γj when the other
server charges cj− . Note again that cj(γj) will be a function
of cj− but we do not make this explicit in the notation. To
lighten notation, we will not make this dependence explicit.
Now let γ∗1(c2) denote the maximizer in program P4 for a
given value of c2. Then the best response c1 is in fact given by
the function c1(γ∗1 (c2)). Therefore, once the function c1(γ1)
is characterized, the best response now denoted by Bˆ1(c2)
satisfies Bˆ1(c2) = c1(γ∗1 (c2)). We now have
(c∗1, c
∗
2) =
{
(c1, c2) : Bˆ1(c2) = c1, Bˆ2(c1) = c2
}
where Bˆi(ci−) = ci(γ∗i (ci−)) and as stated earlier, γ∗i (ci−)
is the maximizer in program P4 for i = 1, 2. It is therefore
clear that (c∗1, c∗2) can be obtained once we have characterized
c1(γ1). We shall analyze the program P4 in detail in Section
V and explicitly characterize the functions cj(γj) for j = 1, 2
to be able to obtain (c∗1, c∗2).
IV. MONOPOLY MARKET
In this section, we will analyze the monopoly program P2.
To be able to solve program P2, we need to characterize
c1(γ1) for a fixed value of c2. This procedure is outlined
below. From Eq. (3) of Theorem 1, we know that when
β1 ∈ (a, b), (and hence γ1 ∈ (0, λ)) we have
c1 − c2 = β1 (D2(γ2)−D1(γ1)) .
We will express the right hand side of the above equation as
a function of γ1, i.e.,
g1(γ1) := β1(γ1) (D2(λ− γ1)−D1(γ1)) (5)
where β1(γ1) represents the threshold β1 for a kernel KW that
satisfies Theorem 1 and corresponds to an equilibrium arrival
rate of γ1. Note that g1(γ1) characterizes the difference (c1−
c2) as a function of γ1. For a fixed c2 and for a γ1 satisfying
0 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ
1(c2) ≤ λ (the domain of γ1 in program P2) we
see that c1(γ1) = c2 + g1(γ1). We characterize c1(γ1) in the
following manner. We first characterize β1(γ1) using Lemmas
1 and 2. Then in Lemma 3, we characterize g1(γ1). For a
fixed c2, we then obtain γ1(c2) in Lemma 5 that determines the
domain of c(γ1) . To prove this lemma we need to characterize
the uniqueness of kernel KW for a fixed difference (c1− c2).
This is part of Lemma 4. Finally we characterize c1(γ1) in
Theorem 2 using g1(γ1) and γ1(c2).
Recall that we make minimal assumptions on the distri-
bution F (·) and on the delay cost function Dj(·). For our
numerical examples and also to illustrate the properties of
the functions β1(·), g1(·) and c1(·), we consider the following
examples for F (·) and Dj(·). The distribution F (·) is from
one of the following;
• Uniform distribution over the range [a, b].
• Exponential distribution with mean τ.
• Gamma distribution with shape k and scale θ.
For the delay cost function, we shall assume one of the
following.
• Dj(γj) =
γj
µj
. This corresponds to the case of linear
delay.
• Dj(γj) =
1
µj−γj
and µj > λ. This corresponds to
M/M/1 type delay cost function.
The distribution and the delay cost functions outlined above
are commonly used to model heterogeneous customers and
congestion costs. (Refer [26], [12], [13], [14], [15])
We now begin with the following lemma that identifies the
necessary and sufficient condition on the equilibrium γ1 when
either c1 ≥ c2 or c1 < c2.
Lemma 1: γ1 ∈ [0, γ+] iff c1 ≥ c2 while γ1 ∈ (γ+, λ] iff
c1 < c2.
Proof: See Appendix for proof.
Refer Figure 3 and 4 for an illustration of the lemma.
Next, we express the threshold β1 of Theorem 1 as a func-
tion of γ1. Recall from the theorem that KW is characterized
by β1 when c1 6= c2. We let β1(γ1) to denote the value of
the threshold β1 (characterizing KW ) for a given γ1 such that
γ1 6= γ
+. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2:
β1(γ1) =
{
F−1
(
λ−γ1
λ
)
for 0 ≤ γ1 < γ+,
F−1
(
γ1
λ
)
for γ+ < γ1 ≤ λ.
(6)
where F−1 represents the quantile function or the inverse
function of the distribution F.
Proof: See Appendix for proof.
Note that β1(γ1) is not defined in Lemma 2 when γ1 = γ+.
This is because the Wardrop kernel KW with γ1 = γ+ is not
unique and need not be characterized by a single threshold.
We shall however assume from now on that when γ1 = γ+
(and hence c1 = c2), the corresponding kernel KW is also
characterized by a single threshold β1. Hence for c1 = c2, we
have
KW (β, 1) =
{
δ1 for β ∈ (β1, b],
δ2 for β ∈ [a, β1].
(7)
As a result, we define β1(γ+) = F−1
(
λ−γ+
λ
)
and the
modified β1(γ1) is now as follows.
β1(γ1) =
{
F−1
(
λ−γ1
λ
)
for 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ+,
F−1
(
γ1
λ
)
for γ+ < γ1 ≤ λ.
(8)
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Fig. 3. Illustrating γ1 ∈ [0, γ+] and c1 ≥ c2.
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Fig. 4. Illustrating γ1 ∈ (γ+, λ] and c1 < c2.
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 β1(γ1) for an exponential distribution
with τ = 20 and a linear delay function Dj(⋅)
 with  µ1  =3.3, µ2 = 4.
Fig. 5. Illustrating β1(γ1) when the servers are not identical.
Refer Fig. 5 for a numerical evaluation of Eq. (8) for the
case when F (·) is an exponential distribution with τ = 20.
The delay functions are Dj(γj) = γjµj where µ1 = 3.3 and
µ2 = 4. Fig. 6 corresponds to the case when the two servers
are identical, i.e., µ1 = µ2 = 4.
Remark 1: Recall our assumption that F (·) is absolutely
continuous and strictly increasing in its domain. Further,
the support is [a, b] and hence F (·) is a bijective function
whose inverse exists. In fact F−1(·) is continuous and strictly
increasing in its domain. Since F−1(·) is continuous in its
arguments, β1(γ1) is continuous when 0 ≤ γ1 < γ+ and
γ+ < γ1 ≤ λ. However at γ1 = γ+, β1(γ1) is in general
not continuous (Refer Fig. 5). For the case when the servers
are identical, i.e., D1(γ) = D2(γ) = D(γ), we see from the
definition of γ+ that γ+ = λ2 . For this case, it is easy to see
that β1(γ1) is continuous at γ1 = γ+, (but not differentiable).
See Fig. 6.
Having obtained β1(γ1), we shall now analyze g1(γ1) that
was defined in Eq. (5). g1(γ1) will be used later to obtain
c1(γ1). We have the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ λ, g1(γ1) is continuous and
monotonic decreasing in γ1. Further, g1(γ+) = 0.
Proof: See Appendix for proof.
See Fig. 7 for a numerical evaluation of g1(γ1) when F (·) is
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Fig. 7. Illustrating g1(γ1) when the servers are not identical.
an exponential distribution with τ = 20 and when the servers
have a linear delay with µ1 = 3.3 and µ2 = 4.
To determine c1(γ1), we also need to identify the domain
over which it can be defined. As argued earlier, this domain
is determined by γ1(c2) which is characterized in Lemma
5. Before stating Lemma 5, we shall first characterize the
7uniqueness of β1, and hence the kernel KW , when c1 6= c2.
While Theorem 1, guarantees existence of a β1 characterizing
kernel KW , it does not guarantee the uniqueness of β1 and
hence the uniqueness of the kernel KW . This result will be
used in the proof of Lemma 5.
Lemma 4: For a given ∆ := (c1 − c2), the threshold β1
characterizing the kernel KW in Theorem 1 is as follows.
β1 =
{
b if ∆ ≥ g1(0) or ∆ ≤ g1(λ),
β1(γˆ) if g1(λ) < ∆ < g1(0)
(9)
where γˆ satisfies ∆ = g1(γˆ). For a fixed ∆, the equilibrium
γ1 and the corresponding β1 is unique and this implies the
uniqueness of KW .
Proof: See Appendix for proof.
We now characterize γ1(c2) in the following lemma.
Lemma 5:
γ1(c2) =
{
λ for c2 ≥ −g1(λ),
γ : g1(γ) = −c2 for c2 < −g1(λ)
(10)
In words, when c2 < −g1(λ) we have γ1(c2) =
{γ : g1(γ) = −c2} and for any c1 ≥ 0, the equilibrium γ1 /∈
(γ1(c2), λ]. However when c2 ≥ −g1(λ), we have γ1(c2) = λ
in which case for suitable choices of c1, γ1 ∈ [0, λ].
Proof: See Appendix for proof.
The above lemma also implies that, if c2 ≥ −g1(λ), then for
any c1 ∈ (0, c2 + g1(λ)) the equilibrium γ1 satisfies γ1 = λ.
On the other hand, if the parameters of the system are such
that c2 + g1(λ) < 0, then for any set of admission prices c1
at Server 1, we have γ1 < γ1(c2).
Remark 2: From Lemma 5, when c2 < −g1(λ), we have
γ1(c2) = γ where g1(γ) = −c2. From Lemma 3, we know
that g1(γ) < 0 for γ > γ+. Hence when c2 ≥ 0, we have
γ1(c2) ≥ γ
+ with strict equality when c2 = 0.
Finally, we have the following theorem to express c1 as a
function of γ1, denoted by c1(γ1).
Theorem 2: c1(γ1) = c2 + g1(γ1) for 0 < γ1 < γ1(c2) ≤
λ. For γ1 = 0, c1(0) must be at least equal to c2 + g1(0),
i.e., c1(0) ≥ c2 + g1(0). Similarly when γ1(c2) = λ, we have
c1(λ) ≤ c2 + g1(λ).
Proof: First consider a fixed γ1 satisfying γ1 ∈
(0, γ1(c2)) for a fixed c2. (γ1(c2) was characterized in Lemma
5.) The corresponding threshold β1 is determined by Eq. (8)
and hence we have β1 ∈ (a, b) for γ1 ∈ (0, γ1(c2)). Recall
that Lemma 4 relates the threshold β1 with ∆. Since β1 < b,
from Lemma 4, ∆ must satisfy ∆ = g1(γ1). Therefore for
a fixed c2, the admission price c1(γ1) resulting in the arrival
rate of γ1 at Server 1 is given by
c1(γ1) = c2 + g1(γ1).
For the case γ1 = 0, from Eq. (8), we have β1 = b. From
Lemma 4, this implies that ∆ ≥ g1(0). From the definition
of ∆, we have c1(0) ≥ c2 + g1(0). Similarly when γ1 = λ,
from Eq. (8), we have β1 = b. From Lemma 4, this implies
∆ ≤ g1(λ) and hence c1(λ) ≤ c2+ g1(λ). This completes the
proof.
In the above theorem, c1(0) and c1(λ) are not uniquely
defined and can take values that satisfy c1(0) ≥ c2+g1(0) and
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c1(λ) ≤ c2+g1(λ) respectively. As convention, we henceforth
define c1(0) = c2 + g1(0) and c1(λ) = c2 + g1(λ). Further
note that the domain for c1(·) is 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ1(c2) and for
γ1(c2) < γ1 < λ, c1(γ1) is undefined. The function c1(γ1)
for 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ1(c2) ≤ λ can now be expressed as follows.
c1(γ1) =


c2 + g1(γ1) for 0 < γ1 ≤ γ1(c2) < λ,
c2 + g1(0) for γ1 = 0,
c2 + g1(λ) for γ1 = γ1(c2) = λ,
(11)
Now recall the revenue maximization problem P2. Define
γ∗1 as the optimizer for this program with the revenue maximiz-
ing admission price given by c1(γ∗1 ). Since RT (c1(γ1), γ1) =
c2λ + (c1(γ1) − c2)γ1, γ
∗
1 must be such that c1(γ∗1 ) > c2.
From Eq. (11), this implies that g1(γ∗1 ) > 0. From Lemma 3
we have g1(γ1) > 0 for γ1 ∈ (0, γ+) and this implies that
γ∗1 ∈ (0, γ
+). The term c2λ in RT (c1(γ1), γ1) is a constant
and hence we have the following equivalent program for the
revenue maximization problem.
max
γ1
g1(γ1)γ1
subject to 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ+
(P4)
where g1(γ1) is given by Eq. (5).
Note from Lemma 3 that g1(·) is a continuous function
of its domain. Program P4 involves maximizing a continuous
function over a compact set and hence a maximizer γ∗1 exists.
The original monopoly program P1 has been significantly sim-
plified to the equivalent program P4. Since g1(γ1) is strictly
decreasing (and hence quasi-convex), g1(γ1)γ1 is in fact a
product of two quasi-convex functions. (However product of
quasi-convex functions need not be quasi-convex function).
One can now use standard non-linear optimization techniques
to obtain γ∗1 . To further understand Program P4, we perform
a numerical evaluation of g1(γ1)γ1 under a combination of
assumptions on the distribution functions F and the delay
functions Dj(γj) that were outlined earlier.
Example 1: In this example we shall assume that the
Dj(γj) =
γj
µj
for j = 1, 2. We assume that µ1 = 3.3 and
µ2 = 4. Further, the arrival rate λ = 3 and we consider the
following three examples for the distribution F (·). (1) F has a
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Fig. 9. RT as a function of γ1 when Dj(γj ) = 1µj−γj
uniform distribution with support on [2, 6]. (2) F has an expo-
nential distribution with mean τ = 4 and (3) F has a Gamma
distribution with the scale k and shape θ parameters 2 and 2
respectively. Note that β with these three distributions have
the same mean. We plot RT (c1(γ1), γ1) = c2λ + g1(γ1)γ1
as a function of γ1 in Fig. 8 where we assume c2 = 1.
When F has the uniform distribution, γ∗1 = 0.62. The optimal
revenue rate RT (γ∗1 ) = 4.306 while the admission price
c1(γ
∗
1 ) maximizing RT is 3.106. The corresponding values for
the exponential distribution are γ∗1 = 0.44, RT (γ∗1 ) = 4.712
and c1(γ∗1 ) = 4.89 while the values for gamma distribution
are γ∗1 = 0.51, RT (γ
∗
1 ) = 4.532 and c1(γ∗1 ) = 4.
Example 2: In this example, we assume that Dj(γj) =
1
µj−γj
where again µ1 = 3.3 and µ2 = 4. Note that λ < µj
for j = 1, 2. The choice of F (·) is as in the previous example.
A plot of RT (c1(γ1), γ1) as a function of γ1 is provided in
Fig. 9. When F has the uniform distribution, γ∗1 = 0.48. The
optimal revenue rate RT (γ∗1 ) = 3.83 while the admission price
c1(γ
∗
1 ) maximizing RT is 2.72. The corresponding values for
the exponential distribution are γ∗1 = 0.33, RT (γ∗1 ) = 4.21
and c1(γ∗1 ) = 4.67 while the values for gamma distribution
are γ∗1 = 0.38, RT (γ
∗
1 ) = 4.04 and c1(γ∗1 ) = 3.74.
We conclude the analysis of the revenue maximization
problem with the following observations made from the two
examples given above.
• Firstly, we see that for the given examples of F,
RT (c1(γ1), γ1) is a unimodal function in γ1. For the
three distribution functions, it can be shown that F−1(·)
is differentiable in its arguments. For such distribution
functions with differentiable F−1(·), this implies that
g1(γ1) and hence RT (c1(γ1), γ1) is differentiable in γ1
when 0 < γ1 < γ+. From Rolle’s Theorem (Theorem
10.2.7 [27]), this implies that there exists a γ1 ∈ (0, γ+)
such that dRT
dγ1
= 0. A γ∗1 satisfying this equation is
the revenue maximizing arrival rate to server 1. The
admission price corresponding to this γ∗1 can now be
obtained using Eq. (11).
• For each of the three distributions, note that we have
E [β] = 4. However, the Revenue rate RT as a function
of γ1 is distinct in all the three cases. This implies that
the revenue rate RT depends on the higher moments of
the distribution F and not just on its mean value.
• Finally, note that RT depends on admission price through
the addition factor of c2λ. For different values of c2, the
corresponding γ∗1 does not change. However it is easy to
see from Eq. (11) that c1(γ1) increases linearly in c2.
V. DUOPOLY
In this section, we shall consider program P4 for revenue
maximization in the duopoly system. Much of the analysis
in this section follows from that of the previous section. Let
γj , j = 1, 2 denote the optimization variable and represent
the admission prices at the respective servers as a function
of the arrival rates. Towards this, we continue with the use
of the notation cj(γj) for j = 1, 2. Note that while in the
monopoly case, the admission price c2 was considered fixed,
in the duopoly of this section, it is the strategy for the second
server and hence will not be a constant. The revenue function
for Server j is given by
Rj(cj(γj), γj) = cj(γj)γj
where cj(γj) represents the admission price at Server j
resulting in an equilibrium arrival rate of γj . As noted in the
previous section, cj(γj) is a function of cj− , the admission
price at the other server. For a fixed strategy c2 at Server 2,
from Eq. (11) the revenue function R1(c1(γ1), γ1) can be
redefined as
R1(c1(γ1), γ1) = (g1(γ1) + c2) γ1. (12)
It can be argued as in the previous section that for a fixed c1
R2(c2(γ2), γ2) = (g2(γ2) + c1) γ2 (13)
where
g2(γ2) = β1(λ− γ2) (D1(λ− γ2)−D2(γ2)) (14)
where from Eq. (8) β1(λ− γ2) is as follows
β1(λ− γ2) =
{
F−1
(
γ2
λ
)
for λ− γ+ ≤ γ2 ≤ λ,
F−1
(
λ−γ2
λ
)
for 0 < γ2 < λ− γ+.
(15)
It is easy to see that g2(γ2) is also continuous and strictly
decreasing in γ2. Further, g2(γ2) = 0 when γ2 = λ−γ+. The
revenue maximization problem for the duopoly is re-stated as
follows.
max
γj
Rj(γj) =
(
gj(γj) + cj−
)
γj
subject to 0 ≤ γj ≤ γj(cj− ) ≤ λ
given cj− .
(P7)
For a given cj− , recall that γ∗j (cj−) denotes the maximizer
of program P4 and hence of the above program. Also recall
that Bˆj(cj−) denotes the best response admission price at
Server j in response to the admission price cj− at the other
facility. Then the Nash equilibrium set of admission prices,
denoted by (c∗1, c∗2), is characterized as follows.
(c∗1, c
∗
2) =
{
(c1, c2) : Bˆ1(c2) = c1, Bˆ2(c1) = c2
}
, (16)
9where Bˆj(cj−) = gj(γ∗j (cj−)) + cj− for j = 1, 2.
We begin the analysis for the duopoly problem by first
identifying that γ∗j (cj−) lies in the interior of the domain.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 6: γ∗j (cj−) /∈
{
0, γj(cj− )
}
.
Proof: See Appendix for proof.
For a given cj− since γ∗j (cj− ) lies in the interior of the
domain, γ∗j (cj−) satisfies
dRj
dγj
∣∣∣∣
γj=γ∗j
= 0 and d
2Rj
dγ2j
∣∣∣∣
γj=γ∗j
≤
0.
Define Sj(cj−) :=
{
γj :
dRj
dγj
= 0,
d2Rj
dγ2j
≤ 0
}
. Then
γ∗j (cj−) is obtained as a solution to the following.
γ∗j (cj− ) = argmax
γj∈Sj(cj− )
Rj(γj). (P8)
From the above discussion, it should be clear that ob-
taining the closed form expression for (c∗1, c∗2) satisfying the
simultaneous equations of (16) is, in general, not easy. Note
that our analysis till now makes minimal assumptions on the
distribution function F or on the delay function Dj(·). For
certain choices of these functions, it may be difficult to obtain
a closed form expression for γ∗j (cj−). The objective function
Rj also need not be a concave function. In that case, a brute
force search among all the local maxima points needs to be
carried out to choose the right γ∗j (cj− ). Instead of satisfying
ourselves with some numerical examples, in the following
subsection we shall analyze the Nash equilibrium under the
restriction that the two servers are identical i.e., the average
delay at any queue is the same for the same arrival rate. Under
this setting, our interest is to characterize the symmetric Nash
equilibrium such that c∗1 = c∗2.
A. Characterizing a symmetric Nash equilibrium
In this section we shall characterize the necessary conditions
for the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium, i.e., (c∗1, c∗2)
where c∗1 = c∗2 := c∗. A natural scenario where such an equi-
librium is possible is when the two servers have identical delay
functions. In this section, we restrict to this case and assume
that Dj(·) = D(·) for j = 1, 2. As the service systems are
identical in their delay characteristics, it is desirable to identify
conditions for existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. We
begin with the following definition. Define α1, α2 as follows.
α1 = −γ
+ dg1(γ1)
γ1
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ+
α2 = −γ
+ dg2(γ2)
γ2
∣∣∣∣
γ2=γ+
(17)
Based on these definitions, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7: α1 = α2.
Proof: From the definition of g1(·) in Eq. (5) we have
dg1(γ1)
γ1
= β′1(γ1) (D2(λ− γ1)−D1(γ1))
+ β1(γ1) (D
′
2(λ− γ1)−D
′
1(γ1))
where the partial derivatives on the r.h.s. are w.r.t. γ1. Now
from the definition of γ+ and from Eq. (8) we have
dg1(γ1)
γ1
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ+
= F−1
(
λ− γ+
λ
)(
D′2(λ− γ
+)−D′1(γ
+)
)
.
Similarly, from the definition of g2(·) we have
dg2(γ2)
γ2
= β′1(λ− γ2) (D1(λ− γ1)−D2(γ2))
+ β1(λ− γ2) (D
′
1(λ− γ2)−D
′
2(γ2))
where the partial derivatives on the r.h.s are now w.r.t γ2. Note
that since γ1 = λ−γ2, we have ∂D1(γ1)∂γ1 = −
∂D1(γ1)
∂γ2
. Further
note that since the servers are identical, i.e., Dj(·) = D(·) for
j = 1, 2 from the definition of γ+ we have γ+ = λ2 . From
Eq. (15) and the fact that λ− γ+ = γ+, we have
dg2(γ2)
γ2
∣∣∣∣
γ2=γ+
= F−1
(
λ− γ+
λ
)(
D′2(λ− γ
+)−D′1(γ
+)
)
.
This proves that α1 = α2.
We now have the following theorem, that characterizes the
necessary condition for a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3: Let c∗1 = c∗2 be a symmetric Nash equilibrium
for the duopoly price competition. Then c∗1 = c∗2 = α1.
Proof: Recall that the Nash equilibrium is characterized
as
(c∗1, c
∗
2) =
{
(c1, c2) : Bˆ1(c2) = c1, Bˆ2(c1) = c2
}
.
where Bˆj(cj−) = gj(γ∗j (cj−)) + cj− for j = 1, 2. This
implies that c∗j = gj(γ∗j (c∗j−)) + c
∗
j−
and since c∗1 = c∗2, we
have gj(γ∗j (c∗j−)) = 0 for j = 1, 2. Now from Lemma 3
and symmetry of the servers, this implies that γ∗1 (c∗2) = γ+
and γ∗2(c∗1) = λ − γ+. Since the servers are identical, we
have γ+ = λ2 and hence γ
∗
2 (c
∗
1) = γ
+. Since γ∗j (cj−) is
also a solution to program P8, γ∗j (cj− ) ∈ S(cj−). From the
definition of S(cj−), this implies that
dRj
dγj
∣∣∣∣
γj=γ+
= 0. Further,
this implies from the definition of Rj(γj) that
dRj
dγj
∣∣∣∣
γj=γ+
= γ+
dgj(γj)
γj
∣∣∣∣
γj=γ+
+ gj(γ
+) + c∗j− (18)
= 0.
We have gj(γ+) = 0 and hence from the definition of αj for
j = 1, 2 we have c∗
j−
= αj . From Lemma 7, we have α1 = α2
and hence c∗1 = c∗2 = α1. This completes the proof.
Note that the above theorem only provides a necessary
condition for the Nash equilibrium pair and we shall soon
see that in fact this condition is not sufficient. We shall
now provide a few examples illustrating the occurrence of
symmetric Nash equilibria.
Example 3: In this example, we assume that Dj(γj) =
γj
µj
for j = 1, 2. Let µ1 = µ2 = 4 while the arrival rate is
λ = 3. We suppose that the distribution F (·) has a uniform
distribution with support of [a, b]. We plot R1(γ1) and c1(γ1)
as a function of γ1 in Fig.10. The aim of this example is
to check whether (c∗1, c∗2) = (α1, α1) is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. For the set of parameters of this example we have
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γ+ = 1.5 and since
α1 = −γ
+ dg1(γ1)
γ1
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ+
we have α1 = 3. We now set c2 = α1 = 3. Clearly, for
a symmetric Nash equilibrium (c∗1, c∗2) = (α1, α1), γ∗1 (c2) =
γ+ = 1.5 must hold. It is easy to see from Fig. 10 that R1(γ1)
is indeed maximized when γ1 = γ+ implying that γ∗1 (c2) =
γ+. Further it can be verified that (c1(γ∗1 (c2)))α1. Clearly,
(c∗1, c
∗
2) = (α1, α1) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium for this
example.
Example 4: With the help of this example, we will illustrate
that the necessary conditions stated in the previous theorem
need not be sufficient. We shall once again assume that
Dj(γj) =
γj
µj
where µ1 = µ2 = 4. As for the choice of
F (·), we consider an exponential distribution with τ = 4. A
plot of R1(γ1) and c1(γ1) as a function of γ1 is provided
in Fig. 11. For this example we start by setting c2 = α1.
However we observe that the best response γ∗1 (c2) 6= γ+ and
hence c1(γ∗1 (c2)) 6= c2. Both these points γ∗1 (c2), c1(γ∗1 (c2)
and (γ+, α1) are represented in Fig. 11. Clearly, (α1, α1) 6=
(c∗1, c
∗
2) and therefore the sufficiency conditions differ from
the necessary ones.
VI. ESTIMATING THE DISTRIBUTION F
Recall that F denotes the distribution function for the delay
sensitivity of the arriving customers. The knowledge of F is
necessary to determine the equilibrium kernel KW introduced
in Theorem 1. Further, the kernel KW must be known for the
revenue maximization problems seen in this paper. However in
most practical situations, the distribution function F may not
be known and due to the unobservable nature of the queues
it may not be possible to even elicit such information from
the arriving systems. In such situations the only alternative
may be to estimate this distribution function. One possible
method to do so is to vary the admission prices at the servers
and then measure the change in the arrival rate of customers
to the different server and then use the Wardrop equilibrium
conditions to estimate F . In this section, we shall describe
a simple procedure to estimate the underlying continuous
distribution function F. Our proposed method is well suited
for a monopoly system when the single service provider has
access to both the admission prices. In this section, we also
consider the case when β is a discrete random variable. In
this case, the customers are divided into finite number of
classes differing in their values of β. The aim is to identify
the value of β for the different classes along with the Poisson
arrival rates λi for the classes. Refer [13], [16], [20] for some
examples of service systems where such discrete customer
classes are considered.
Throughout this section, we shall make the following as-
sumptions. We shall assume that the two servers are modeled
as M/M/1 queues with service rates µ1 and µ2 and admission
prices c1 and c2 respectively. With this assumption, we have
Dj(γj) =
1
µj−γj
. It goes without saying that our analysis
will also hold for any delay cost Dj(·) that is monotonic and
strictly increasing in its arguments. We assume that once the
admission prices c1 and c2 at the servers are announced and
that the Wardrop equilibrium is achieved, each server j will
accurately determine or measure the equilibrium arrival rate
γj and the mean delay cost Dj(γj) for j = 1, 2. Hence the
measured values γj and Dj(γj) and the the corresponding
quantities at the Wardrop equilibrium will be assumed to be the
same. We also assume that the total arrival rate of customers
to the system denoted by λ is known a priori and that c1 > c2,
i.e., the admission price at the first server is higher than the
second. Note that since the distribution F (·) is unknown,
the functions β1(·), g1(·), c1(·) also cannot be determined and
used for our procedure.
We begin by estimating the distributions F that belongs
to a parameterized family, say for example the exponential
distribution. Let the parameter for the exponential distribution
be denoted by α. When c1 and c2 at the two servers are
fixed, the equilibrium γ1 and γ2 at the servers is measured
immediately. We choose a c1, c2 such that γj > 0 for j = 1, 2.
From this, the mean delay cost Dj(γj) for j = 1, 2 is also
calculated. Since all the quantities (except β1) in Eq. (3) of
Theorem (1) are known, the threshold β1 can be determined as
β1 =
c1−c2
D2(γ2)−D1(γ1)
. Now increase c1 to c11 where c11 = c1+δ
for δ > 0. This decreases the equilibrium γ1 to say γδ1 . Let
βδ1 denote the threshold when the arrival rate to Server 1
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is γδ1 . Again, using the measurements of the arrival rates
and the delay functions βδ1 can be determined from Eq.
(3). Since γδ1 < γ1 < γ+, from Lemma 2, we know that
β1(γ
δ
1) > β1(γ1). This implies that βδ1 > β1. Clearly, the
ratio γ1−γ
δ
1
λ
is the probability of an arriving customer with
β ∈ [β1, β
δ
1 ] and hence
∫ βδ1
β1
αe−xαdx =
γ1 − γ
δ
1
λ
. (19)
The only unknown quantity is the exponential parameter α
which can now be obtained from the above equation.
Remark 3: Since the exponential distribution has a single
parameter, the parameter could be obtained using only Eq.
(19). For a parameterized distribution with k parameters, we
need k simultaneous equations in terms of the underlying
parameters. These can be obtained by following the procedure
above for k different admission price
{
ck1
}
at Server 1.
We will now describe a numerical method to obtain a
piecewise constant approximation for the density function f
that is not necessarily from a parameterized family of distribu-
tion functions. As an example, consider a random variable β
supported on the range [0, 4]. Suppose the distribution function
is
P (β ≤ x) = F (x) =
x2
16
.
The corresponding density function is denoted by f(x) is x/8
for x ∈ [0, 4]. For this example assume that there are two
M/M/1 servers with service rates µ1 = 5 and µ2 = 5,
admission prices initially set to c1 = c2 = 5 and the total
arrival rate λ = 5. As earlier, we assume that once the
admission prices at the servers are announced, the Wardrop
equilibrium is reached instantaneously and each servers can
accurately determine the aggregate arrival rates and the mean
delay per customer.
Increase c1 by δ > 0 and for the admission price vector
(c1+δ, c2), measure the equilibrium arrival rates and the mean
delay in the queues and calculate the corresponding threshold
β1 using Eq. (3). Repeat this for a finite number of times,
each time increasing c1 from its previous value by δ. This
experiment is denoted in Table I.
c1 c2 γ1 β1
5.0 5 1.98 2.84
5.2 5 1.69 3.04
5.4 5 1.44 3.20
5.6 5 1.23 3.33
5.8 5 1.05 3.44
6.0 5 0.89 3.53
6.2 5 0.75 3.60
6.4 5 0.63 3.67
6.6 5 0.52 3.37
6.8 5 0.43 3.78
TABLE I
THE TABLE INDICATES THE PRICE VECTOR (c1, c2), THE MEASURED
VALUE OF γ1 AND THE THRESHOLD β OBTAINED FROM EQ. (3).
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Fig. 12. Comparing the estimate of f(·) with the true density function.
Using the earlier notation, we observe from the table that
as c1 increases to, say c1 + δ, γ1 decreases to γδ1 while the
threshold β1 increases (to βδ1). As earlier, we have∫ βδ1
β1
f(x)dx =
γ1 − γ
δ
1
λ
where the density function f(x) is to be estimated. Assume
for all x ∈ (β1, βδ1) that f(x) = z, where z is a constant.
By assuming this, we are approximating the density function
f(x) for x ∈ (β1, βδ1) by a horizontal line of magnitude z and
thus approximating f(x) by a piecewise constant function. As
δ → 0, the approximation should converge to the true density
function. We now have
z =
γ1 − γ
δ
1
λ(βδ1 − β1).
(20)
The value of z for a fixed c1 and c1 + δ can be viewed as an
estimate for the density function f(x) and obviously z → f(x)
as δ → 0. These values of z for different values of c1 are given
in Table II.
c1 c1 + δ z
5 5.2 0.37
5.2 5.4 0.39
5.4 5.6 0.41
5.6 5.8 0.42
5.8 6.0 0.44
6.0 6.2 0.44
6.2 6.4 0.45
6.4 6.6 0.46
6.6 6.8 0.47
TABLE II
THE ESTIMATES z CAN BE OBTAINED FROM EQ. (20) FROM THE
SUCCESSIVE CHANGES IN THE ADMISSION PRICES AND THE
CORRESPONDING MEASUREMENTS OF THE ARRIVAL RATES.
A plot comparing the true density function and the estimate
is given in Fig. 12. The plot shows that the estimate of
the density function is reasonably accurate and for better
estimation, one naturally required more of such measurement
points.
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Fig. 13. Estimating the discrete distribution F
There is however a limitation to this method. Note that when
c1 = c2, the corresponding value of β1 = 2.84. Any increase
or decrease in either c1 or c2 cannot result in a β1 such that
β1 < 2.84. This is because, for the underlying distribution we
have from Eq. (8) that β1(γ+) = 2.84 and for any γ ∈ [0, λ]
with γ 6= γ+, we have β1(γ) > β1(γ+). As a result, the
density function f(x) cannot be estimated for x ≤ 2.84.
A. Estimating Discrete Distribution
We shall now consider the case where the distribution F
is a discrete distribution with M point masses. Thus, there
are M customer classes and we will assume that for each
Class i, the associated waiting cost βi and the arrival rate
λi are unknown. Further, β1 > β2 . . . > βM . See [13] for the
analysis of Wardrop equilibrium of such a model. We continue
with the assumption that there are two servers each charging
an admission price c1 and c2. We begin by setting c2 = 0
and c1 to an arbitrarily large value such that γ1 = 0 while
γ2 = λ. This is represented in part (a) of Fig. 13. It goes
without saying that the necessary assumption is that µ2 > λ.
Now start decreasing c1 in steps of size δ and stop at the
first instance when γ1 increases to an arbitrarily small value
ǫ. We use the notation cj1 and γ
j
1 to denote the admission price
and the arrival rate at Server 1 when c1 is decreased j times
by δ, i.e., when cj1 = c1 − jδ. γ1 = ǫ implies that the most
sensitive delay class β1 must now be using Server 1 along
with Server 2. Since the delay function at each queue can be
measured, β1 can be easily determined from the corresponding
Wardrop condition
cj1 + β1D1(γ
j
1) = β1D2(γ
j
2).
We will now determine λ1 corresponding to this β1. Continue
decreasing c1. The proportion of Class 1 customers using
Server 1 keeps increasing till all Class 1 customers use only
Server 1. When this happens, the corresponding Wardrop
equilibrium condition for some k > j satisfies
ck1 < β1
(
D2(γ
k
2 )−D1(γ
k
1 )
)
and this is represented by part (b) in Fig. 13. For a Class
2 customer to start using Server 1, the Wardrop equilibrium
condition is
cm1 = β2 (D2(γ
m
2 )−D1(γ
m
1 ))
where m > k. Further since m > k, we have
β2 (D2(γ
m
2 )−D1(γ
m
1 )) < β1
(
D2(γ
k
2 )−D1(γ
k
1 )
)
.
and hence for all l such that k < l < m, we have
β2 (D2(γ
m
2 )−D1(γ
m
1 )) < c
l
1 < β1
(
D2(γ
k
2 )−D1(γ
k
1 )
)
.
This means that for any cl1 satisfying ck1 < cl1 < cm1 , γl1 and γl2
remain unchanged. Clearly in this case λ1 = γl1. Fig. 13, part
(c) represents the fact that for any c1 > cm1 , Class 2 customers
use both the servers at Wardrop equilibrium. Continue this
process till all the λi, βi as well as the number of customer
classes M is determined. It should be noted that the accuracy
of our method increases as δ → 0. A downside of a small δ is
that the procedure may take a very long time to discover the
system parameters.
VII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have considered the problem of revenue
maximization in parallel server systems. We specialize with
the case of two servers and first assume the case when both
the servers belong to the same service provider. The admission
price at one of the server is required to be fixed and the
service system can change the admission price at the other
server to maximize its revenue. The Wardrop equilibrium when
customers are heterogeneous and strategic has already been
characterized in our earlier paper. We use this characterization
to simplify the revenue maximization program to make it
more amenable to analysis. The equivalent program is easy to
interpret, analyze and provides more insight into the problem.
While it is intuitive that for a fixed c2, the revenue maximizing
c1 should always be greater than c2, the program enables to
characterize the revenue maximizing c∗1 as a function of c2.
In the second part of the paper, we consider the duopoly
model where each server competes with the other one to
maximize its revenue. This is a standard game-theoretic
problem and the aim is to identify the Nash equilibrium
set of prices. We see however that since the customers are
heterogeneous, the first order necessary conditions are not
easy to solve. Instead, we characterize this Nash equilibrium
for a simplified case when the two servers are identical in
their delay characteristics. In this case we are interested in the
symmetric Nash equilibrium prices. We provide the necessary
condition for this case and identify the Nash equilibrium prices
for different distributions F and delay cost functions D(·).
In both these problems problems and also in the social
welfare maximization problem of our previous paper, an
important assumption is that the distribution function F is
known. We relax this assumption in Section VI and provide a
procedure to estimate this distribution. The proposed method
is of course preliminary and assumes that one is allowed
to change admission price any number of time to measure
the change in the equilibrium arrival rate. Further, we have
assumed that there is no cost to making such measurements. A
more realistic method incorporating these practical limitations
may make the problem more relevant and this is part of future
work.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1
Proof: We first prove that γ1 ∈ [0, γ+] implies c1 ≥ c2.
Recall the definition of γ+ that
γ+ = {γ1 : D1(γ1) = D2(γ2)} .
Since Dj(γj) is monotonic and increasing in γj for j = 1, 2
and that γ2 = λ − γ1 we have D1(γ1) ≤ D2(γ2) for γ1 ∈
[0, γ+]. Now let γ1 = 0. Since no customer uses Server 1 at
equilibrium, this implies that c1+βD1(0) > c2+βD2(λ) for
all β. Since D1(0) < D2(λ) (assumption) c1 > c2 must be
true.
When γ1 = γ+, we will show that c1 = c2. Suppose this
is not true, i.e., γ1 = γ+ while c1 6= c2. γ1 = γ+ implies
D1(γ1) = D2(γ2). As c1 6= c2, customers have an incentive
to move from the server with a higher admission price to the
one with a lower price. This implies that γ1 = γ+ is not an
equilibrium and this is a contradiction.
Now consider γ1 ∈ (0, γ+) where D1(γ1) < D2(γ2). From
Theorem 1, γ1 ∈ (0, γ+) implies β1 ∈ (a, b) and hence c1 +
β1D1(γ1) = c2+β1D2(γ2). Since D1(γ1) < D2(γ2) we have
c1 ≥ c2.
We now prove that if c1 ≥ c2, then γ1 ∈ [0, γ+]. We first
show that when c1 = c2, we have γ1 = γ+. Suppose that
when c1 = c2, γ1 6= γ+. From the definition of γ+ we have
D1(γ1) 6= D2(γ2) and hence customers have an incentive to
move from the server with higher expected delay to the one
with lower expected delay. This implies that when c1 = c2,
γ1 6= γ
+ is not an equilibrium.
Now let c1 > c2. From Theorem 1 we have either β1 = a
or β1 = b or β1 ∈ (a, b). The case β1 = a corresponds to
the case when all customers choose Server 2 at equilibrium
and this cannot happen! This is because while c1 > c2, we
have also assumed D1(λ) > D2(0). KW with β1 = a will be
possible only if
c1 − c2 ≤ β(D2(0)−D1(λ))
for all β ∈ [a, b]. Now this is not possible as the left hand
side is positive while the right hand side is negative. It is
straightforward to see that when β1 = b, we have γ1 = 0
and hence γ1 ∈ [0, γ+]. When β1 ∈ (a, b) we have c1 +
β1D1(γ1) = c2 + β1D2(γ2). Again, since c1 > c2, we have
D1(γ1) ≤ D2(γ2) and this requires γ1 ∈ (0, γ+). The proof
for γ1 ∈ (γ+, λ] follows along similar lines and will not be
provided. This completes the proof.
Lemma 2
Proof: From Lemma 1, γ1 ∈ [0, γ+) implies that c1 > c2
while γ1 ∈ (γ+, λ] implies c1 < c2. Now from Theorem 1,
when c1 > c2, we have
γ1 = λ
∫ b
β1
1dF (β) = λ(1− F (β1)).
Similarly, when c1 < c2 we have
γ1 = λ
∫ β1
0
1dF (β) = λ(F (β1)).
Now β1(γ1) defined as the value of threshold β1 when the
equilibrium arrival rate to Server 1 is γ1 can be represented
as follows.
β1(γ1) =
{
β :
∫ b
β
λdF (β) = γ1 for 0 ≤ γ1 < γ+,
β :
∫ β
a
λdF (β) = γ1 for γ+ < γ1 < λ.
(21)
Now as seen earlier, F (·) is absolutely continuous and strictly
increasing in its domain. Further, the support is [a, b] and
hence F (·) is a bijective function whose inverse exists. In fact
F−1(·) is continuous and strictly increasing in its domain. The
statement of the lemma now follows.
Lemma 3
Proof: Recall our assumption that Dj(γj) is continuous
and monotone increasing in γj where j = 1, 2. Since γ2 =
λ− γ1, (D2(λ− γ1)−D1(γ1)) is monotone decreasing in γ1
for 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ λ. Recall Eq. (8) that determines β1(γ1). For
0 ≤ γ1 < γ
+, β1(γ1) is continuous and strictly decreasing.
The continuity follows from that of F−1(·). Since F−1(·) is
strictly increasing in its arguments, F−1
(
λ−γ1
λ
)
= β1(γ1)
is decreasing in γ1. Clearly, g1(γ1) is monotone decreasing
when γ1 is such that 0 ≤ γ1 < γ+.
When γ1 is such that γ+ < γ1 ≤ λ, from the definition of
γ+, we have (D2(λ − γ1) − D1(γ1)) < 0. In this range of
γ1, it can be seen from Eq. (8) that β1(γ1) is continuous and
increasing in γ1. This again implies that g1(γ1) is continuous
decreasing when γ1 satisfies γ+ < γ1 ≤ λ.
g1(γ
+) = 0 follows from the definition of γ+ where
D1(γ
+) = D2(λ−γ
+). The continuity at γ+ is obvious from
the fact that g1(γ+) = 0 and limγ1→γ+ g1(γ1) = 0.
Lemma 4
Proof: Suppose ∆ ≥ g1(0). From the definition of ∆ and
from Eq. (5), this implies that
c1 − c2 ≥ b (D2(λ)−D1(0))
≥ β (D2(λ) −D1(0))
for all β ∈ [a, b]. From the Wardrop equilibrium condition,
this implies that KW (β, ·) = δ2 for β ∈ [a, b]. This implies
that γ1 = 0 and from Eq. (2) we have β1 = b. Similarly when,
∆ ≤ g1(λ) < 0 we have
c1 − c2 ≤ b (D2(0)−D1(λ))
≤ β (D2(0)−D1(λ))
where β ∈ [a, b]. Again, from the Wardrop equilibrium
condition, this implies that KW (β, ·) = δ1 for β ∈ [a, b].
Hence γ1 = λ and from Eq. (2), we have β1 = b.
Now suppose g1(λ) < ∆ < g1(0) where we know that
g1(0) > 0 and g1(λ) < 0. From Lemma 3, we know that
g1(γ1) is monotonically decreasing in γ1. Therefore there
exists a unique γ with 0 < γ < λ such that ∆ = g1(γ).
This proves the uniqueness of γ1. To see how β1 = β1(γ)
note that ∆ = g1(γ) implies that
c1 − c2 = β1(γ) (D2(λ− γ)−D1(γ)) .
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Now if γ ≤ γ+ we have D2(λ− γ) > D1(γ). In this case,
c1 − c2 ≤ β (D2(λ− γ)−D1(γ))
for β ∈ [a, β1(γ)]. This means that KW (β, ·) = δ2 for all
β ∈ [a, β1(γ)]. Similarly, we have
c1 − c2 ≥ β (D2(λ− γ)−D1(γ)) (22)
and KW (β, ·) = δ1 when β ∈ [β1(γ), b]. Similar arguments
hold when γ > γ+ and hence β1 = β1(γ) when g1(0) < ∆ <
g1(λ).
From Theorem 1, KW is characterized by β1 and for a
fixed ∆, β1 is unique. This implies uniqueness of KW . It is
important to mention that KW is unique when ∆ = 0 because
of the assumptions made to ensure β1(γ1) well defined at
γ1 = γ
+
.
Lemma 5
Proof: Suppose c2 satisfies c2 < −g1(λ). Assume that
c1 = 0 so that we have ∆ > g1(λ). From Lemma 4 this
implies that the equilibrium γ1 satisfies g1(γ1) = ∆ = −c2.
Let us label this γ1 as γˆ. Now increase c1 from c1 = 0 by a
small ǫ > 0 such that there exists γ1 that satisfies ∆ = ǫ−c2 =
g1(γ1). Now from the monotonicity of g1(·) it is clear that the
equilibrium γ1 is decreasing as ∆ increases. This implies that
a higher ∆ caused by increasing c1 will only lead to a γ1
satisfying γ1 < γˆ. Clearly, for any choice of c1 ≥ 0, we have
γ1 /∈ [γˆ, λ] and hence for this case γ1(c2) = γˆ.
Now suppose that −c2 ≤ g1(λ). When c1 = 0, this implies
∆ ≤ g1(λ) and from Lemma 4 this implies β1 = b with the
corresponding γ1 satisfying γ1 = λ. As we increase c1, the
equilibrium γ1 decreases and hence γ1 satisfies γ1 ∈ [0, λ].
The compact representation now follows.
Lemma 6
Proof: To reduce the notations, we represent γ∗j (cj−)
by γ∗j in the proof of the lemma. We shall prove that
γ∗1 /∈
{
0, γ1(c2)
}
and the proof for γ∗2 /∈
{
0, γ2(c1)
}
is along
similar lines. Suppose γ∗1 ∈ {0, λ} . Then from the requirement
that γ∗1 = λ − γ∗2 , we have either (1) γ∗1 = 0 and γ∗2 = λ or
(2) γ∗1 = λ and γ∗2 = 0. First consider the case when γ∗1 = 0
and γ∗2 = λ. This implies that R1(c1(0), 0) = 0 and hence the
revenue made by Server 1 at equilibrium is zero. Further since
this is an equilibrium, there is no incentive for the server to
change the admission price and increase its revenue. We shall
now show that this is not true. From Theorem 2, we know
that for a given c2, the admission price at Server 1 must be
at least c2 + g1(0) > 0. Now we know that setting c1 = c2
will result in γ1 = γ+. Now due to the assumption that (1)
D1(0) < D2(λ) and (2) D2(0) < D1(λ), there exists an ǫ > 0
such that setting c1 = c2 + ǫ will result in γ1 ∈ (0, γ+). The
revenue earned is non-zero and there is clearly an incentive to
deviate from any value greater than c2 + g1(0). This implies
that γ∗1 = 0 and γ∗2 = λ is not possible. The proof for γ∗1 = λ
and γ∗2 = 0 is along the same lines.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Naor, The regulation of queue size by levying tolls, Econometrica 37
(1969) 15–24.
[2] N. Edelson, D. Hilderbrand, Individual and social optimization in a
multiserver queue with a general cost benefit structure, Econometrica
40 (1972) 515–528.
[3] U. Yechiali, On optimal balking rules and toll charges in the GI/M/1
queue, Operations Research 19 (1971) 349–370.
[4] C. Larsen, Investigating sensitivity and the impact of information on
pricing decisions in an M/M/1/∞ models, International Journal of
Production Economics (1998) 365–377.
[5] H. Chen, M. Frank, State dependent pricing with a queue, IIE Transac-
tions 33 (10) (2001) 847–860.
[6] N. Edelson, D. Hilderbrand, Congestion toll for Poisson queuing pro-
cesses, Econometrica 43 (1975) 81–92.
[7] H. Mendelson, Pricing services: queueing effects, Communications of
the ACM 28 (5) (1985) 312–321.
[8] H. Mendelson, S. Whang, Optimal incentive-compatible priority pricing
for the M/M/1 queue, Operations Research 38 (5) (1990) 870–883.
[9] R. M. Bradford, Incentive compatible pricing and routing policies
for multi-server queues, European Journal of Operational Research 89
(1996) 226–236.
[10] Y. Masuda, S. Whang, Dynamic pricing for network service: equilibrium
and stability, Management Science 45 (1999) 857–869.
[11] H. Chen, M. Frank, Monopoly pricing when customers queue, IIE
Transactions 36 (6) (2004) 569–581.
[12] T. Bodas, A. Ganesh, D. Manjunath, Load balancing and routing games
with admission price, in: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control, 2011.
[13] T. Bodas, A. Ganesh, D. Manjunath, Tolls and welfare optimization for
multiclass traffic in multiqueue systems, arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.7195.
[14] I. Luski, On partial equilibrium in a queuing system with two servers,
The Review of Economic Studies 43 (1976) 519–525.
[15] D. Levhari, I. Luski, Duopoly pricing and waiting lines, European
Economic Review 11 (1978) 17–35.
[16] M. Armony, M. Haviv, Price and delay competition between two service
providers, European Journal of Operation Research 147 (2003) 32–50.
[17] H. Chen, Y. Wan, Price competition of make-to-order firms, IIE Trans-
actions 35 (9) (2003) 817–832.
[18] P. Dube, R. Jain, N-player Bertrand-Cournot games in queues: Existence
of equilibrium, in: Proceedings of the 46th Annual Allerton Conference
on Communication, Control, and Computing, 2008, 2008, pp. 491–498.
[19] P. Dube, R. Jain, Diffserv pricing games in multi-class queueing network
models, in: Proceedings of International Teletraffic Congress (ITC-22),
2010.
[20] M. Mandjes, J. Timmer, A duopoly model with heterogeneous
congestion-sensitive customers, European Journal of Operational Re-
search 3 (2007) 445–467.
[21] G. Allon, A. Federgruen, Service competition with general queueing
facilities, Operations Research 56 (2008) 827–849.
[22] G. Allon, A. Federgruen, Competition in service industries, Operations
Research 55 (2007) 37–55.
[23] J. G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research com-
munication networks, Proceedings of Industrial and Civil Engineering 1
(1952) 325–378.
[24] U. Ayesta, J. Anselmi, A. Wierman, Competition yields efficiency in
load balancing games, in: Proceedings of the IFIP Performance, 2011,
pp. 968–1001.
[25] M. J. Osborne, An Introduction To Game Theory, Oxford University
Press, USA, 2003.
[26] T. Bodas, D. Manjunath, On load balancing equilibria in multiqueue
systems with multiclass traffic, in: Proceedings of NETGCOOP, 2011.
[27] T. Tao, Analysis (Volume 1), Hindustan Book Agency, 2006.
